4

The Growth of Regionalism: Implications for the International System

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It is often suggested that the development of regionalism and regional identities throughout the international system is detrimental to trends toward globalization. This article argues that the growth of regionalism is not at the expense of globalization. Rather, it is a trend which can be exploited in the development and implementation of policy toward regions that traditionally have been less developed, less organized, and less influential in the international system. First defining and then examining the existence of regionalism, this article provides theoretical justification for the growth of regionalism today, focusing specifically on three regions: Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast Asia. Examining the growth of regionalism in those three areas for a period of 35 years, the degree of organization in each region over time is measured. Interpretation of the data presented here results in discussion of the necessity of regional cohesion in increasing a region's influence at the global level. The article concludes with speculation about the different ways in which the international system or a representative nation such as the United States might be expected to react to higher levels of regional organization. Policy implications are discussed throughout.

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Introduction

Regionalism is a term often used but rarely defined in current discussion of international affairs. It is identified regularly as a vague threat to trends toward globalization and is generally assumed to have negative connotations. Regions are the building blocks of the international system and changes that take place within them affect the international system overall. For that reason, the discussion of regionalism is relevant to both international systems study and policymaking. Indeed, regions and their development provide a context for the explanation of systemic trends and governmental trends, some of which are speculated upon at the end of this article.

The argument in this study points to the fact that one of the clearest manifestations of regionalism is the development of regional multilateral institutions, simultaneously making the argument that the development of regional institutions and the higher degree of organization which it implies about a region have implications for the way the region interacts with the international system overall. A practical manifestation of this might be seen in differences in a systemic institution's or representative nation's policymaking and implementation relating to a region, varying with the level of regional organization.

To provide theoretical justification for the development of cooperation in the form of multilateral institutions is the first task of this article. For purposes of this argument, neoliberal institutionalism is used as a theoretical explanation not only for increased cooperation among states but also for the development of multilateral institutions. The existence of such institutions and their growth over time in a particular geographic area is pointed to as a manifestation of regionalism.

The applicability of the aforementioned theoretical arguments to the development of regionalism is also discussed. Several perspectives on regionalism are examined, with emphasis on the development of regionally-oriented institutions in three developing areas of the world: Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast Asia. The degree of organization in these regions over time is measured, and discussion centers on the relationship between the existence of a multilateral institution and the level of intra-regional organization. Using empirical evidence, this article shows how the three regions' development, specifically the degree of organization among states in a region, has increased since the 1960s, suggesting that the characteristics of regionalism can develop both with and without the existence of a central multilateral institution.

Finally, discussion turns to the systemic consequences of changing degrees of regional organization, whether or not it results from the establishment of regional institutions. What higher levels of regional organization mean for the way the international system in general, and the system's representative states in particular, relate to a region is considered. Certainly, changes in a region's degree of organization are interesting on their own merit. However, this article attempts to put those changes in a systemic context, suggesting that implications for the international system result from higher levels of regional organization and addressing the question of how the degree of regional organization makes a difference in the way the system reacts to a specific region. It is reasonable to expect that policies toward a region will vary in relation to the region's degree of organization. Discussion concludes with suggestions for further study of the systemic implications speculated upon here.

Theoretical Background

Before delving into analysis of increasing intra-regional cooperation, it is first necessary to provide a general discussion of why states cooperate at all. Reasons why cooperation is prevalent in regions are discussed at a later point. The general assumptions and theoretical reasoning behind international cooperation must first be put forth to justify discussion of cooperation at the regional level later. Furthermore, it is important to make clear this article's assumption that states remain the most important actors in the international system.

Although the purpose of this article is to consider the effects on the international system of the growth of multilateral regional institutions, the institutions considered here are those comprised of sovereign nation states that have willingly entered into cooperative arrangements with their neighboring states. Though they may contribute to a domestic mood supportive of interstate cooperation and ultimately the establishment of inter-state regional institutions, transnational and non-governmental organizations are not the focus of this article. This article employs a system-level analysis in considering cooperation, changes in degrees of regional organization, and effects of that degree of organization on the subsequent behavior of states. Such systemic emphasis in no way undermines the article's intent to prove the significance of states bound together in official regionally-oriented institutions. The fact that states are increasingly seeking the benefits derived from closer official cooperation with regional neighbors does not change the fact that states remain the primary actors in the international system.

Explaining Cooperation

Cooperation in the international system has long been discounted by realists who argue that, since the international system is fundamentally anarchic, cooperation among sovereign nations is not rational state behavior; if states do cooperate, it is for immediate gains at the expense of other states. Attacking the realists by incorporating integral parts of their argument, the neoliberal institutionalists submit that cooperation is the result of potential for conflict. It is only when states, in seeking to protect their own interests, see that cooperation with other states will help them best realize their policy goals, that they opt for cooperation. International institutions, neoliberal institutionalists insist, provide a forum in which mutually beneficial arrangements can be made.

Anticipating the realist critique that, as a result of the anarchy of the international system, there is no motivation or enforcement mechanism to force states to obey the rules set forth in institutions, the neoliberal institutionalists argue that a state's failure to respect the norms of a given regime could damage the reputation of the offending state and make it more difficult for that state to enter into subsequent agreements, either bilateral or multilateral. Based on this assumption, states enter into agreements because to do otherwise would risk being excluded from international regimes, which could have negative repercussions. It is therefore in a state's continued best interest to cooperate within the framework of an international institution despite the fact there is no hierarchical system ready to immediately punish those states that do not comply with its rules. This contributes to the neoliberals' perception of international institutions as loose frameworks that have much to offer states that participate and abide by the rules.

Cooperation Manifested: A Central Assumption

Multilateral institutions are manifestations of cooperation. While the article focuses primarily on such institutions in a regional context, general discussion of the benefits states derive from participation in multilateral institutions is helpful for explaining why states participate. The generalities of this discussion can then be applied to the specifics of cooperation at the regional level. John Gerard Ruggie suggests the benefits of "diffuse reciprocity" as a motivating factor for cooperation in multilateral regimes. He defines multilateralism as "relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles . . . which specify appropriate conduct . . . without regard to the . . . interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in a specified outcome" (Ruggie 1993, 12). Ruggie thus

provides an explanation for how and why states come together to cooperate within the confines of an institution for the long-run, content to view the ongoing cooperative relationship as a non-zero sum game. In other words, one state's gain at a particular period of time as a result of cooperation is not necessarily to the detriment of other cooperating states.

Arguments like Ruggie's suggest that cooperation is not remarkable even given the relatively anarchic nature of the international system. Cooperative regimes can have an impact on states' calculations of benefits and ultimately can alter the ways in which states define their interests. Not surprisingly, states choose to cooperate first with their neighbors, with whom they are likely to share some common cultural, societal, political, or economic characteristics—conditions that make cooperation easier to attain.

Cooperation in the international system has a number of implications for the way in which states relate to one another. That states recognize the inherent benefits of diffuse reciprocity and thus agree to participate in a regional organization for the benefits it can provide is an assumption on which this article's argument relies. Without this assumption, one must necessarily be distracted by offering explanations for why, despite no immediately obvious benefits of a state's membership in an organization, it remains a part of the group.

Free from the necessity of discussing specific motivations for cooperation, this article will examine the implications of changing degrees of organization in a region and its subsequent effects on the international system as a whole.

Regionalism Defined

The Link between Regionalism and Globalization

In his discussion of regionalism, Andrew Hurrell presents a highly useful definition of globalization, calling it a "metaphor for the sense that a number of universal processes are at work generating increased interconnection and interdependence between states and societies" (Hurrell 1995, 345). This definition has utility because it identifies regionalism as part of the globalization process rather than being detrimental to it. For purposes of this article, regionalism is understood to be the development of those universal processes at a sub-systemic level.

The threat posed by regionalism is that those regional trends will lead to the fragmentation of the international system rather than to its unification. One scholar argues that the development of regions could lead

in one of two different directions: segmentation or differentiation (Nierop, 1994). Segmentation is defined as the division of the overall international system into smaller parts, with international politics eventually becoming characterized by several different international systems or blocs instead of one world-wide system. In contrast, differentiation, it is suggested, is the development of a system of overlapping cobwebs where the relations among states in one issue area are not coincident with the same states in different issue areas. The reasoning contained within this article shows that one should not expect segmentation to be the result of growing levels of intra-regional organization. It is realistic, however, to expect to find more coordination than is implied by the definition of differentiation as a result of higher degrees of organization within a specific region.

Thus, "regionalism" can be understood to be consistent with the definition put forth by Muthiah Alagappa: "Cooperation among governments or non-government organizations in three or more geographically proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue-areas" (Alagappa 1995, 362). As mentioned earlier, discussion of cooperation here is limited to that between governments. Non-government cooperation is an equally valid aspect of regional development, though beyond the purview of this piece. Conclusions drawn throughout may be assumed to be at least partially applicable to discussion of non-state actors, particularly as they pertain to systemic implications of increasing degrees of organization in a region.

The development of regionalism can be presented in various ways and requires acknowledgment that increasing cooperation among states is a necessary condition for the appearance of regionalism; indeed, it is difficult to separate the cause from the effect. How regionalism manifests itself is the point of discussion in this section. Differing perspectives are offered in order to demonstrate various interpretations of the issue. As alluded to in the introduction, consideration of the different interpretations makes clear why the development of regions is seen as both a threat and a boon to globalization. Ultimately, this article concludes that regionalism can have more positive than negative effects on the process of globalization.

Characterizing Regionalism

According to Andrew Hurrell, what has come to be known as the new regionalism in international politics can be characterized by several different trends. Identification of these characteristics lends a great deal to the discussion of regionalism, particularly as it pertains to this article.

First, there is great diversity in the number and type of regional schemes. The relationship between various regional organization types and their interactions with the global system, he suggests, is "central to the politics of contemporary regionalism" (Hurrell 1995, 332). Also important for understanding the development of modern regionalism, Hurrell argues, are the development of "North/South regionalism," the differences among regional organizations in the level of institutionalization, the increasingly blurred line between political and economic regionalism, and, finally, the general increase in the number of regional organizations around the world (Hurrell 1995, 332). Loosely defined, then, regionalism as it is understood today is a combination of these trends. Awareness of these trends is an important prerequisite to discussion of the development of regional organizations in the three regions on which this article focuses, as it shows how the development of such organizations in the three regions is not happening in a vacuum. Cases examined here are merely representative of trends evident across the planet.

In addition to identifying its general characteristics, Hurrell also categorizes the concept of regionalism. His categories are addressed briefly here, with the intent of settling on a conceptualization of regionalism that is appropriate to the trends observed in the following case studies. He calls the first category "regionalization." This term relates to the growth of "societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction" (Hurrell 1995, 332). It encompasses growing flows of people as well as market rather than state-driven policy-linked integration.

It is also necessary to consider the concept of regional identity when discussing regionalism. There can be no doubt that growing awareness of regional identity contributes to what is increasingly recognized as regionalism. Discussing regional identity, Hurrell writes, "As with nations, so regions can be seen as imagined communities which rest on mental maps whose lines highlight some features whilst ignoring others" (Hurrell 1995, 335). Thus, although membership in a region for the purposes of this article is restricted to membership in the representative regional organizations, it is important to recognize that regions and regional identity are social constructs. It is only with the development of cooperative policies and subsequent cooperative institutions that the social construct begins taking on concrete characteristics.

Additionally, Hurrell classifies regional inter-state cooperation as a category of regionalism (Hurrel 1995, 336). This concrete manifestation of regionalism involves the actual construction of intergovernmental

institutions, both formal and informal. It is a broad category, immediately relevant to the preceding theoretical discussion of motivation for participation in cooperative regimes. In a sense, regionalism is a manifestation of trends first identified and then justified by neoliberal institutionalists.

Lastly, Hurrell points to regional cohesion (Hurrel 1995, 337). This is the epitome of regionalism. It is the result of the full development of the characteristics of regionalism and it implies that a combination of regionalization, regional identity, and regional inter-state cooperation, as outlined above, could lead ultimately to the development of a regional unit—a region-state. Much scholarly attention has been accorded to the region that has come closest to achieving this degree of regional cohesion—Europe, and its leading institution, the European Union. The intent of this project is to examine instead the development of three regions which traditionally receive less attention, particularly with respect to application of theoretical arguments in conjunction with practical discussion of policy applications.

Indeed, the majority of regionalist writings employ Europe as a case study of the development of regional identity and the move toward the attainment of a region-state. This study deliberately focuses on developing countries in regions of the world which are generally of less interest to scholars seeking to prove regionalist arguments. In order to truly understand the dynamics of regionalism and changes in degrees of regional organization, it is necessary to consider regionalism in its early stages and to speculate upon how changes in regional organization in a developing region might influence the way the system or its representative states may respond to the region and its constituent parts.

Identifying Degrees of "Regionness"

Hurrell's identification of regionally-oriented trends leads to discussion of what can be called levels of "regionness." Distinctions between these levels are made by Bjorn Hettne (Hettne 1994, 134–66). Providing concrete examples of regionalism and distinctions between degrees, his presentation of the characteristics of degrees of regional organization suggests further that the evolution of a region is a continuing process, and that different regions of the world are simply at different stages of development. That there can be different degrees of organization is demonstrated in this article's case studies as attention is given to three specific regions and to the development of degrees of organization in these regions over time.

At the first level of regional organization, Hettne identifies a region simply as a unit with specific geographic and ecological characteristics. He

suggests, as an example, the Indian subcontinent, or Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic. The second level of organization is that of a region as a social system, implying social, cultural, and political relations within the region. This would include a balance of power system in the region, very real in terms of its impact on states in the region, but not consciously constructed by those states. Third, he defines a region as an area of cooperation on political, military, economic, and cultural matters, defined by regional organizations. Finally, Hettne considers regions as complete regional civil societies, promoting increasing social communication in the region as well as convergence of values, emphasizing culture. Common culture is a prerequisite for the final level of regional organization: a regional state (Hettne 1994, 135–6).

These comments form a clear parallel to Hurrell's discussion. Combined consideration of both Hurrell's and Hettne's arguments presents a fairly complete picture of how regionalism is conceptualized, and it identifies the signs of increasing degrees of regional development. Discussion of their perceptions serves as an introduction to what regionalism can look like, depending upon interpretation. The trends that Hurrell describes and the degrees of regional organization that Hettne identifies are presented here as background for the dynamics leading to what is actually observed in the case studies below.

Having introduced regionalism and its various conceptualizations, as well as its links to global (systemic) trends, discussion now turns to the three case studies which show how degrees of regional organization have increased in the last 35 years. The author agrees with arguments put forth by both Hurrell and Hettne which suggest that trends in regionalism ultimately can lead to the development of a more unified regional actor. This article's argument goes a step further by suggesting that the resulting changes in the nature of the region's interaction with the international system have significant systemic implications. Before addressing those implications, however, discussion must first turn to the three case studies which show how degrees of regional organization have increased in the last 35 years. This sets the stage for specific discussion about how the degree of regional organization influences a region's interactions with the international system.

Three Case Studies: Measuring the Degree of Regional Organization

Using the preceding discussion as context, the following case studies are intended to show the measurement of degree of regional organization.

Theoretical discussion has shown the motivations of states to seek cooperation in international regimes. Discussion of regionalism has accepted those motivations and gone on to identify practical trends in cooperation at the regional level. This section is intended to present a way to measure the distinctions between levels of "regionness" in three specific regions: Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast Asia.

It is expected that the establishment of a regional institution increases the degree of organization and interaction among states in a region. This study expects to prove that levels of organization in a region increase after the establishment of a regional multilateral institution. This is consistent with Joseph Nye's basic argument in *Peace in Parts* where he argues that "Regional organizations help create islands of peace in world politics" (Nye 1971, 198). The systemic implications of the resulting peace are discussed following the case studies.

An alternative perspective, which the case studies here show should be considered, is that the relationship can also work in the other direction: increasing levels of organization within a region can lead to the establishment of a regional institution. Regardless of the order in which increased levels of intra-regional organization and regional institutions develop, and there does seem to be evidence that it can go either way, the implications for the international system and policymaking remain the same.

Methodological Approach and Rationale

The purpose of the case studies is to argue that, as the level of organization in a region increases, one should expect to see increased levels of contact and interconnectedness among states of that region, and that these changes can be measured. It is predicted that three major aspects of a region's interstate relations (generalized interaction, economics, and security) change following the establishment of a regional institution and result in the following: increases in the number of regional institutions, increased intra-regional economic contact, and decreased spending on weapons imports. Together these changes are considered representative of an increased level of organization in a particular region.

Theoretically these increased levels will be manifested in greater numbers of regional organizations, increasingly higher percentages of trade conducted within a region, and decreases in amounts of money spent on import of weapons to a region. It is posited that the combination of these three measurable changes can be used to track increases in degrees of organization in a region over a thirty-five year period of time, and can be

Table 1: Degree of Regional Organization



used to produce a scale showing change over time in the degree of intra-regional organization. All three factors were chosen with the expectation that increased cooperation among states can be measured (See Table 1). For purposes of discussion of regionalism, this higher degree of regional cooperation is termed a change in "degree of organization" of a region.

The first factor considered for measure of degree of regional organization is applicable for fairly obvious reasons. The number of regionally-oriented institutions to which countries in a region have belonged through the years is considered a valid indicator of the level of "regionness." It allows one to tap into the government relations aspect of changes in the degree of organization in a region. It is assumed that the higher the number of institutions in a region, the higher the degree of organization in that region. Increases in their number through time would indicate one trend in the direction of higher degrees of intra-regional organization. The assumption is that higher numbers of regional institutions are then indicative of higher levels of governmental interaction and cooperation. This is true for increases in all three factors under consideration in this case study, but is most clearly visible in this measure.

The export statistics of countries in a region over time is the second indicator of changes in degrees of regional organization. In the case studies, trade figures for each country in a defined region are examined at a given period of time, with the value of exports to other countries in the region expressed as a percentage of the total value of a country's exports.

The percentages for each country of a region are then averaged, resulting in a single number representative of the intra-regional exports of a region's countries as a percentage of the region's total export value.

Export figures are an acceptable indicator of degree of regional organization because they allow one to see changes over the course of time in the value of contact—in this case economic—among countries of a region. A clear example of Ruggie's diffuse reciprocity, interaction, which in this case is economic cooperation, has benefits that are more than short-term and are spread around, not benefiting any state at the expense of others. Export figures serve as a measure of the economic aspect of changes in the degree of organization in a region. It is assumed that the greater the value of intra-regional exports, the more important good relations with neighboring states become, and the more likely economic contact is to spur on additional interaction, thus further raising the degree of organization in a region.

The final factor considered in the case studies is the value of imports of conventional weapons to a region over time. This is chosen as an indicator in order to tap the security-related aspects of changes in degree of regional organization. In choosing this factor, it is assumed that as cooperation among states increases, levels of trust between countries in a region increase. This is manifested in decreases in the value of arms the region imports as a percentage of the total of world arms imports. In other words, as the governments of countries of a region become more familiar with one another, perhaps through high-level talks among leaders, the degree of trust among those countries' governments subsequently increases. Increases in trust as a result of contact on various fronts are then manifested in the decreasing value of arms imported to the region; as nations increasingly trust their neighbors, they will be less concerned about defending themselves against those neighbors. This can be explained through regional institutions, which, as suggested by both Keohane and Ruggie, offer states an attractive way to increase contact with other states in a region, thus promoting that contact and subsequent cooperation.[1]

These three factors, considered at five year intervals for the period from 1960 to 1994, are combined to arrive at a composite figure representing "degree of organization" for a given region at a particular period of time. Results are graphed for each region individually, with degree of organization termed low, medium, or high at different time periods. It is expected that the most dramatic increases in degree of organization will be seen following the establishment of the regional institution under consider-

ation. There must be some trend, however small, of increased regional interaction to justify the establishment of formalized interactions, represented by the three institutions considered below. The relationship, of necessity, goes both ways, but the major developments are expected post-institutional establishment.

Even if this is not proven empirically, there is still expected to be sufficient evidence to argue that there has been an identifiable trend toward increasing degrees of regional organization in the last 35 years, whether or not it coincides with the establishment of a regional institution. The timing of increases in regional organization would be easiest to explain if they coincided with the founding of an institution. However the most important aspect of regionalism, for purposes of this article, are the changing degrees of organization, and linking those changes to speculation about how the international system reacts to the changes.

Defining Regional Membership

As suggested by both Hurrell and Hettne's discussions of regionalism, one of the first challenges of considering regionalism is defining a region and, subsequently, identifying member nations. The three regions under discussion here are Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast Asia. Regional identity is defined simply as membership in the regional institution under discussion.

In the case of Southern Africa, the institution is the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. For the case of South America, the institution under consideration is the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Member states of that organization are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. For Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the organization on which discussion will focus. Members include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Southern Africa and the SADC

Originally founded in 1979 as the Southern Africa Development Community Conference (SADCC), the organization now known as the Southern Africa Development Community was intended to develop countries of the region in order to lessen their dependence on South Africa. With the reorganization of the original multilateral institution in 1992, South Africa became a member, thus fully meeting the regime's regional

membership potential. Although intended to be primarily economic in nature, the institution did clearly have political motivations in its origins, as shown by its early intent to reduce regional dependence on South Africa.

Writing about the older SADCC, Carol Thompson suggests the link between state and regional interests, as implied by the Neoliberal Institutionalist argument presented earlier: "SADCC's pursuit of balance and equity signifies a recognition that the most effective cooperation occurs when national and regional interests coincide" (Thompson 1992, 194). This statement verifies the relationship between state interest and regional cooperation, the same relationship that makes the neoliberal institutionalist argument distinct from the realists.

Southern Africa is an interesting case precisely because it is one of the least developed regions economically. In this case, economic cooperation must be a prerequisite to any further cooperation. The first reason for this is that development cannot be undertaken alone by these countries which lack sufficient levels of natural resources to attain self-sufficiency. Second, economic development helps ensure that there is in fact more to link in the region in the future; economic development creates a framework within which further cooperation, both economic and otherwise, can take place.

As is evident in Table 2, the degree of organization in the region has increased fairly steadily since the establishment of the SADCC in 1979. This appears consistent with the argument that a regional institution promotes regional interaction and cooperation. Although prior to 1979 there was some indication of regional development, it seems to have faltered, only to be reinstated by the establishment of a regional institution. From the results of the case study it is difficult to say definitively if the existence of SADCC and later of SADC further promoted trends toward regionalism in Southern Africa. This is partly because the establishment of such organizations cannot be distinguished easily from the rising tide of regionalization.

What both Hurrell and Hettne identify as regionalism can be said to have developed in Southern Africa since 1960. Increases in the degree of regional organization, which is in this study considered to be significant evidence of the growth of regionalism, have clearly taken place in Southern Africa since the early 1960s. Although Southern Africa remains one of the globe's most impoverished regions, trends in regional development are nonetheless apparent. Practical evidence of this is seen in the discussion of regional problems, where the search for answers centers on the desire for

Table 2: Ranking of Factors Contributing to Degree of Regional Organization

Southern Africa

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	L	M	M	M	M	M	M
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	L	L	L	L	M	M	M
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	L	M	M	L	M	H	H

Southern America

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	L	M	M	M	M	M	M
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	L	L	L	L	M	M	M
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	L	M	M	L	M	H	H

Southeast Asia

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	L	M	M	M	M	M	M
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	L	L	L	L	M	M	M
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	L	M	M	L	M	H	H

See Appendix 1 for raw data. See Appendix 2 for explanation of ranking system. The raw data is ranked low (L), medium (M), or high (H) in each of the three categories: number of regional institutions, intra-regional exports, and weapons imports. A score of 1 is given to every L, 2 to every M, and 3 to every H. The results of this ranking are seen in Appendix 1.

an "African solution" to African problems (Future Vision 2010: Africa, 1996). This seems to be a growing indication of what Hurrell refers to as regional identity. The statistics examined in this article provide empirical evidence of the trend toward regionalization in Southern Africa.

The Southern Cone of South America and MERCOSUR

MERCOSUR is the newest of the regional institutions discussed in this project. It was established in early 1994, but this fact does not disqualify the region, that is MERCOSUR's current members, from consideration in this study. The purpose of its selection is to examine the development of a region with great potential for effective multipurpose institutions, unrealized until recently, and to determine if development of the degree of intra-regional organization is negatively impacted over time by the lack of such an institution. In reality, it seems quite the opposite is the case. According to analysis here, there has been steady growth in the degree of regional organization in this section of South America for at least the last 35 years.

By including in the empirical analysis all five countries which are now members of MERCOSUR, the study clearly shows growing interaction among those states and potential for formalized cooperative institutions over time. To consider the five states in the study before the formal establishment of the institution is a risky venture, but the results seem to have warranted the risk. For example, although the five Latin American states currently participating in MERCOSUR now have institutionalized relations on an increasing number of fronts, albeit still primarily economically-oriented, the increasing degree of organization among those states since 1960 provides evidence that, in at least some cases, increasing degrees of regional organization prompt the establishment of formal institutions. In the Southeast Asian region, in contrast, the results are almost the opposite, with the establishment of a formal institution seeming to be the cause of higher degrees of regional organization. As noted earlier, regardless of the cause of higher levels of "regionness," the implications for the international system remain the same. That is addressed in the next section.

As alluded to above, the primary purpose of MERCOSUR is, in fact, economic cooperation. The size of the MERCOSUR market is a bit more than half that of the European Union, and is composed of almost 200 million consumers. As an indicator of the degree to which economic cooperation has been achieved in the short period of time since the institution's establishment, one business writer states that a foreign

company "can gain access to all [five] countries by investing in just one of them" (McCrary 1994, 86). The logical explanation for this can be found in the empirical evidence. Because there was already a high degree of intra-regional organization at the time MERCOSUR was founded, the process of implementing the agreement was merely a formality. The practical groundwork for the agreement was already firmly in place, and clearly had been developing since at least the early 1960s. Furthermore, there is a growing tide of commentary in which hopes for and belief in the institution's ability to promote a broader range of cooperation encompassing political and social issues are expressed. The results of this study indicate that there is potential for further cooperation since interaction among the states is already extensive and there is a good deal of familiarity among members.

The results of examination of the South American region are the most striking of the three case studies here and presented the author with an analytical problem: the degree of intra-regional organization evidenced by this study's focus on the countries that now comprise MERCOSUR forces consideration of the possibility that the relationship between regional institutions and the degree of intra-regional organization is a two-way street. Not unlike the question, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?", the study's results beg the question, "Which came first, intra-regional organization or multilateral regional institutions?" As in other aspects of social science, it seems the answer is "it depends."

Southeast Asia and ASEAN

As the oldest of the regional frameworks under consideration here, ASEAN and the region in which it operates were expected to provide the strongest evidence of the positive impact of a regional institution on the development of the degree of organization in a region. As seen in Tables 1 and 2, however, this did not prove to be the case. The establishment in 1967 of a formal mechanism to promote intra-regional cooperation has not had the striking effects that its proponents may have anticipated. As with the African case, all countries which are presently members of the organization were considered through all the time periods. In the case of Southeast Asia this has a marked effect due to the presence of Vietnam. The arms import factor negatively impacts the region's degree of organization in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, the final graph is an accurate representation of the nature of relations among states in the region.

As seen in Table 2, although the number of regional institutions has remained relatively low, the amount of intra-regional trade has remained

moderate and steady. The very steadiness of those numbers is an indication of the effect of ASEAN. Although it too was founded with primarily economic intention in mind, ASEAN's potential to serve as a mechanism for higher levels of political cooperation is well-recognized. It is the member states' hesitation to pursue other aspects of cooperation that prevents the institution from developing a better track record on multilateral cooperation.

Regardless of the unexpectedly poor results for the ASEAN region in this study, it can still be argued that the long-standing institution has had a positive influence on the nature of relations among states in the Southeast Asian region. Increased contact has led to less conflict and to greater exposure of various cultures in the region. As a recent article about ASEAN and its still unrealized potential acknowledges, "Before 1967 it was possible to think of Southeast Asia as a region in name only. The countries of the region enjoyed geographic proximity but little else. In 1960 for example, for every Thai who visited [neighboring countries], there were 200 who went to England, France, or the United States . . . [I]t can be argued that ASEAN is largely responsible for creating the increased sense of regional identity" (Cronin and Metzgar 1996, 1). Even critics of ASEAN's ability to perform on non-economic matters acknowledge the success of the institution in promoting intra-regional contact.

Although the SADC's original motivation for cooperation as mentioned above was as a counterweight to South Africa's initial regional influence, ASEAN's external motivation for cooperation is increasingly relevant. One of the benefits ASEAN has provided since 1967 is decreased conflict among its members. The resulting unity is of particular benefit as the region tries to find ways to respond to China. A number of ASEAN's members are in disagreement, not only with each other but also with China over possession of the Spratly Islands. ASEAN's ability to defuse a potentially dangerous situation in which China was poised to militarily assert its ownership of the islands shows how even states which had national interests involved chose to cooperate with regional neighbors in order to respond to a foreign threat. This would not have been possible without the contact promoted by ASEAN since the late 1960s.

As an older regional institution, at least as it relates to this study, ASEAN meets with more criticism than younger institutions like the SADC and MERCOSUR. ASEAN is increasingly criticized for not realizing its full political and security potential in the region (Cronin and Metzgar 1996, 4). The economic success of ASEAN is well-recognized and no one disputes the role it has played in the phenomenal economic growth seen in Southeast Asia over the last several decades, yet simply because of

its potential beyond the scope of economics, ASEAN is expected to do more.

The empirical results of this study of Southeast Asia indicate that increases in the degree of regional organization are not a given with the establishment of a regional institution. In fact, the ASEAN region is at present the only region of the three which is not at a high degree of regional organization. This is one of the most interesting results and one which certainly deserves further study.

Preliminary Conclusions

Analysis of the three factors this study considers relevant to the development of degree of organization in a region has yielded interesting results, each with unique implications for the discussion of regionalism and wide-ranging implications for the international system as a whole. As suggested above, the existence of a regional institution is not a necessary precondition for the development of intra-regional organization. In the case of Southern Africa, the SADC's precursor institution's establishment in 1979 seems to have stabilized a drop in regional organization and set the region on an upward trend. This is consistent with the arguments of Hurrell and Hettne who argue that the establishment of an institution formalizes relations and sets the stage for more extensive cooperation. The only unexpected aspect of the Southern Africa case study is that according to this study's criteria, Southern Africa, as represented by the SADC, is currently at a high degree of intra-regional organization. This is in contrast to conventional wisdom about the region which assumes Southern Africa is underdeveloped and continues to be handicapped by regional conflict.

In the Southern America region, as defined by membership in MERCOSUR, it seems the development of an intra-regional organization among the five states progressed without the assistance of a formal multilateral institution. Although membership in other regional institutions is a factor contributing to the degree of regional organization, because no other multilateral institution consists of that same combination of states, a higher occurrence of membership in regional institutions is a factor which, while contributing to the degree of regional organization, does not overstate states' cooperation. The five states have the steadiest development of regional organization of any regional institution in the study, but without the presence of a formal institution. While the arguments of both Hurrell and Hettne are very tempting theoretically, particularly with respect to expectations of further regional development after the establishment of an institution, their arguments seem to have

been disproved in the case of MERCOSUR. The Southern America example makes clear that institutionalized cooperation is not a necessary condition for the development of "regionness" or higher degrees of regional organization.

As mentioned above, the Southeast Asian case study produced the most unexpected results. It completes nicely the sample of regional institutions considered here because the institution, ASEAN, was founded near the beginning of the time period under consideration. It is the only of the three cases where the name of the region is synonymous with the name of the institution. Yet it is the region with the most unrealized potential—in this case represented by the lowest current degree of regional organization. To reiterate, the important result becomes clear when compared with MERCOSUR, a group of states representing steadily growing degrees of regional organization without formalized relations; ASEAN and its states on the other hand, represent a region of highly formalized relations with unsteady results.

While Nye's comment about regional institutions forming "islands of peace in world politics," is not untrue, it appears regional institutions are not the only way to achieve those islands of peace. What is important for the international system is how those islands fit into the system as a whole. How the international system should be expected to respond to the varying relationships between regional institutions and degrees of regional organization, and how lessons learned can be incorporated consciously into the dynamics of the international system is the focus of the next section.

Practical Implications of Increased Regional Organization

Analysis above has demonstrated the development of higher degrees of regional organization over time in the three cases examined. The growth of regionalism, both with and without the aid of official regional multilateral institutions has been proven, and it is expected that similar evidence would be found in similar analysis of other world regions. The next and final step is to consider how the international system responds to regionalism. As mentioned previously, there is a link between regionalism and globalization; because the development of regionalism does not happen in a vacuum, it is necessary to show how regionalism relates to systemic matters. As Hettne argues in his presentation of levels of regionness, the development of regionalism is a process unfolding at three different levels. It affects the structure of the world system as whole, it affects the nature

of relations within a region, and finally, it affects the internal patterns of nations in a particular region (Hettne 1994, 160). Having demonstrated the gradual development of intraregional organization in the three case studies in the last section, the argument is now directed toward the effects of these developments on the international system. Attention is devoted specifically to the changes, which higher degrees of regional organization should be expected to cause, in the way the system or a representative nation approaches relations with a more highly organized region. The following discussion is intended to emphasize the implications of higher degrees of regional organization for the international system as whole.

The development of higher degrees of organization in a region is not an isolated affair. It is logical to expect to see differences in the way a region behaves as result of higher levels of regional organization, such as decreased conflict among states in a region. More importantly for the purposes of this discussion, however, one should also expect to see differences in the way the international system as a whole responds to a region. Regionalism, whether defined simply as higher degrees of regional organization or instead as its manifestation—regional institutions—should be expected to have an external, systemic impact. The development of "regionness" at every level has an influence on the way the international system responds. This section is intended to discuss individual changes that one might expect to take place as the growth of regionalism continues. This is purely speculative. But discussion does suggest various ways in which the systemic response could be measured to determine the accuracy of suppositions put forth here.

Identifying a Systemic Actor

How one perceives the international system is the first step in speculation about how the development of regionalism should be expected to affect systemic behavior. To proceed with this hypothetical argument, an actor representative of the international system and its priorities must be identified and its use in further discussion justified. The United Nations, the one truly universal actor in the international system, could be considered representative of the priorities of the members of the international system, with its allocation of resources indicative of systemic priorities. However, recent criticism of the UN's inability to perform its functions has been blamed on the American failure to meet its obligations to that international organization.

The American decision to withhold funding from the UN and the rationale behind it is a matter beyond the scope of this discussion. Of interest for the purposes of this article, however, is the apparent fact that

without American funding, the United Nations is unable to function fully. The successful U.S. effort to replace the Secretary General also implies the continuing strength of the United States in the international system and provides the rationale for this article's consideration of the U.S. and its policies as representative of systemic priorities. Fair or not, as the most influential state in the international system, the United States can often be considered representative of the international system. Moral discussion of whether one state should exert such extreme international influence is a subject beyond the purview of this article. By identifying these two actors here the author seeks to suggest only that use of either U.S. or UN information relevant to the following categories in subsequent studies might allow one to begin to ascertain changes in the way the international system responds to regions at varying degrees of intra-regional organization. It is expected that changes in state or other actor behavior can be assumed to have its origins in changed policies, thus making the link between changing degrees of regional organization and alterations in systemic priorities.

Perceptions of Regional Effectiveness and the Allocation of Resources

Much discussion of regionalism, at least by those who do not view it as a trend threatening to the process of globalization, results in utopian predictions of the development of region-states. It is more practical to focus instead on the advantages which organized regions can reap at present, even without the elimination of national borders implied by the term region-state. The effectiveness of particular regional institutions is a factor worthy of systemic attention as systemic actors decide whether or not to devote resources to a particular organization or instead to its member states. How an institution has promoted regional organization, a subject considered above, could be used as an indicator of that institution's effectiveness. This matter is briefly discussed below.

Assuming that the international system recognizes changes in a region's degree of internal organization, it is rational to expect changes in the way the system treats that region. It is speculated that there are several specific areas in which the attention devoted to a region could be expected to change. How increases in degree of regional organization affect the way the international system or a representative nation relates to a region is addressed.

Although any of the factors considered below would alone provide great insight into the way the international system responds to regional changes, the most complete discussion of the systemic implications of higher

degrees of regional organization would include consideration of at least what is listed below. Indeed, measurement of the following factors as they relate to a specific region over time would make quite clear the systemic implications of changing degrees of regional organization as presented above. The following five factors are provided as suggestions for how best to tap into the specifics of what increasing degrees of organization in a region really mean for the international system, and how those changes might be expected to manifest themselves at the systemic level.

Economic Relations

The first of several areas in which one might expect to see concrete changes in systemic behavior as a result of higher degrees of regional organization includes changes in the type and distribution of foreign assistance and other economic contact. Here one must not fail to recognize that the amount of aid received is not determined solely by degree of regional organization, but rather by an examination of the level of economic development. The SADC case is proof of that distinction. As degree of regional organization increases, the manner in which aid is distributed may be expected to change. So, too, the economic emphasis from abroad is likely to change. As the regional atmosphere becomes more conducive to international trade, one may expect to see increasing extra-regional trade.

In the case of Southeast Asia, for example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is already donating large percentages of its aid to the region to ASEAN projects rather than to the projects of individual countries (United States Agency for International Development, 1994). This indicates an awareness of the potential of a region, organized under a stable, long-standing multilateral institution, to allocate resources in a way that is more beneficial to regional economic development than it is to the welfare of individual states. This could even be identified as an unexpected manifestation of diffuse reciprocity.

With respect to decreases in the actual amount of development assistance as a result of regional organization, decreases related to regional organization could be expected if the system recognizes a region's desire to find its own solutions to its own problems, as mentioned earlier concerning the case of Southern Africa. At present, however, it is clear that this African region remains too economically underdeveloped to be able to afford pursuit of its own solutions at this time. Generally speaking, however, the ability of a highly organized region to effectively allocate the development assistance it receives should not be underestimated. It seems

the U.S., an actor representative of the international system, has already recognized this.

On the practical side, the allocation of aid to competent regional institutions rather than to individual nation states would likely have budgetary benefits for programs like those of USAID because it would require less oversight. At the same time it would promote the growth of regional organization with the potential to further strengthen the leading regional institution.

The foreign assistance factor could be measured over time, determining the amount and type of aid allocated to a region, examining at the same time whether the majority of aid was given to individual states or to the representative regional institution. Collection of this information (for example, from aid figures of the United States) combined with a measurement of degree of regional organization as ascertained earlier, would allow a comparison of aid relative to degree of organization. Results would provide insight into the international system's ability to recognize changes in degree of regional organization and to respond accordingly. This would be one means of measuring changes in the international system's attention to a region.

Foreign Relations

It is likely that as the degree of organization in a region changes, the issues with which diplomatic representation in those countries deal will also change. Consider the role of American diplomatic staff, for example. As economic development and other forms of cooperation proceed peacefully, partially as the result of improved relations among regional states, the duties of diplomatic staff change. Instead of promoting regional aid programs or attempting to defuse regional conflicts which can detract resources from programs more oriented toward the further development of regional cooperation, staff might instead be promoting educational or cultural exchange programs or the development of tourism to further promote regional ties.

Also related to increased regional interaction, the international system might promote further security cooperation in the form of military exchanges and joint training. This would be to the benefit of the international system because it would contribute to uniformity of both procedure and perhaps equipment throughout the region. Increased contact and familiarity further eliminates the possibility of conflict and breeds trust—both of which are priorities of an international system which seeks to use regionalism as a stepping stone to globalization.

Additionally, as a region increases its level of organization, it is likely one will find that the benefits derived from the increases contribute to higher level attention from system actors. One might expect to see an increase in state visits to a region as the level of regional organization increases. High profile visits could coincide with high-level meetings of the primary regional institution, giving further legitimacy to the institution and showing systemic support for the continued growth of the institution and the degree of regional organization to which it contributes.

This switch in systemic behavior and priorities would be based on the assumption that the system values the further development of regions for the benefits it produces, instead of fearing the worst-case scenario suggested by Nierop's definition of segmentation.

Like the foreign assistance factor, the diplomatic attention factor could also be measured over time, using U.S. or UN figures as representative of the international system. Measurements could be attained by examining the division of labor at American Embassies or UN offices in all the countries of a region over time. One would seek information in particular about programs encouraged by staffs as discussed above, such as exchanges, security cooperation, or preparation for state visits. When compared with the degree of regional organization over the same time period, results would indicate how systemic priorities change and at what degree of organization the most significant changes occur. This, too, would indicate changes in the attention a region receives from the international system relative to degree of regional organization.

Media Coverage

A third area in which one might expect to see changes in the way the international system reacts to different degrees of organization in a region is in the international news coverage allocated to the discussion of regional issues. As the degree of regional organization increases, the type of coverage devoted to a region is expected to change.

For a region with a low degree of organization, characterized as implied earlier by regional conflict or epidemics, international news coverage could be expected to be sporadic but intense. An example would be the coverage of Rwanda in American media. As a result of conflict between two ethnic groups, hundreds of thousands of refugees have crossed national borders seeking shelter. In a region with a higher degree of organization, one might expect refugee flows to be prevented or at least controlled, thus removing the need for intense international coverage.

As the degree of intra-regional organization increases, the same factors which could contribute to changes in the type of aid received by a region could influence the type of coverage a region receives. In a more stable and more highly organized region, international media attention would likely be more steady and more focused on fewer crisis-related matters. Instead of political conflict or humanitarian crises, the focus of attention could become investment opportunities, promotion of tourist destinations, and cultural and educational exchanges. In other words, it is assumed the stability of a region increases with the increase in the level of regional organization, and with regional stability comes a different kind of international media attention.

The media variable could be measured by categorizing coverage of a region over time, noting changes in degree of regional organization over the same period, and identifying patterns. International media attention could be measured by surveying over a period of time American news or a combination of countries' coverage of a region, focusing primarily on newspaper and television, identifying stories by type. Possible categories include humanitarian and epidemic crises, political upheaval (both civil and regional), sports, culture, finance, tourism, and political development.

Results of a comparison of international news coverage of a region over time with the degree of intra-regional organization would provide insight into how the international system responds to changes in regional development. The media factor is a particularly important one because of its ability to influence international public opinion. The effects of improved international opinion of a region would likely have an effect on the other factors discussed in this section. Favorable public opinion of a particular region in an aid-giving country might, for example, allow for increased aid allocations to the region. At the same time it could force high level official attention, thus changing the nature of diplomatic relations between the system or its representative nations and the region.

Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

Finally, it is speculated that MNCs, thriving on stability and potential or realized economic growth, which, as suggested above, are two related manifestations of higher degrees of regional organization, would be more likely to establish operations in regions with higher degrees of organization. Discussion of MNCs presents the problem of analyzing actors that are not directly affiliated with states and yet are increasingly important parts of the international system.

In this situation particularly, it would be difficult to distinguish between motivating factors for the establishment of a MNC's operations; discussion here has indicated that the line between a region's attractiveness because of its degree of regional organization versus its attractiveness as a developing economic area is a fine one indeed.

Measurements of MNCs' presence throughout a region could be taken by determining what percentage of the region's economic activity results from the business of MNCs. A comparison of that figure over time with the degree of regional organization would allow some insight into how, if at all, the presence of MNCs in a region is influenced by degree of regional organization. As suggested by Peter Cowhey and Jonathon Aronson, private firms are more likely to respond to international changes than governments (Cowhey and Aronson 1993, 236). This might allow one to expect reasonably that changes in the regional presence of MNCs would be detected sooner than changes in various government behavior, such as foreign assistance and diplomatic attention. In fact, one could even find that changes in MNCs' policies are precursors of other systemic changes. This reason alone provides sufficient justification for consideration of the presence and activity of MNCs in a region.

Conclusion

Clearly there are numerous ways in which changes in the attention of the international system and its representatives can be related to the degree of organization in a region, with a variety of implications for policymaking. The last section suggested a few possibilities for further study, commenting on the usefulness and applicability of each, and noting pitfalls where evident.

From the outset, this article has attempted to place the development of regionalism in a systemic context. The immediately preceding section is merely the most clearly articulated link between the development of regions and the international system and the changes one might expect to see manifested in policymaking concerning regions and the international system overall. Such discussion, however, remains purely speculative.

Discussion has demonstrated the rationality of expecting regional trends to influence the behavior of the international system. This study has been intended to provoke further discussion of regionalism with an eye toward systemic implications, suggesting examination of changes in systemic attention over time as they compare to the degree of regional organization. It is hoped that empirical examinations of changes in systemic attention resulting from varying degrees of regional organization,

the groundwork for which is laid out above, will be pursued by interested parties in the future.

APPENDIX 1

Raw Data for each region

Sources: Regional Institution information taken from CIA World Factbook, various issues from 1980 to 1995; Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995. Intra-regional export information taken from International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1961, 1967, 1977, and 1987; IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 1989 and 1995. Weapons import information taken from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1994.

Southern Africa

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	3	4	5	5	5	5	6
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	8.37	6.48	10.18	8.21	13.44	9.49	14.69
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	14.57	7.29	7.23	11.39	7.66	1.30	.52

Southern America

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	3	4	4	5	6	7	8
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	10.27	13.40	10.22	15.55	16.18	21.60	33.54
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	8.72	6.42	7.87	8.41	9.24	3.35	1.74

Southeast Asia

	1960–64	1965–69	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990–94
Number of Regional Institutions	1	3	3	3	3	4	4
Percent of Intra-Regional Exports	19.98	30.06	16.69	13.67	17.28	14.34	19.84
Weapons Imports as Percent of World Total	33.30	30.01	19.88	12.51	9.55	2.30	6.83

APPENDIX 2

Explanation of Raw Data Ranking System

1. Manipulating Raw Data

The data in Appendix 1 are examined for each of the three categories: number of regional institutions, percent of intra-regional exports, and weapons imports as percent of world total. The raw numbers are broken down into three levels: low, medium, and high. The purpose of Part 1 of Appendix 2 is to present the break-down of raw data as an explanation for the low, medium, and high rankings found in Table 1 in the text.

A. Number of regional institutions

The number of regional institutions is the first factor contributing to this study of degree of regional organization over time. The numbers in this row throughout Appendix 1 are the sum of the number of inter-governmental regional institutions in existence during the time period under discussion. The ranking system is as follows:

0–3 institutions: LOW
4–6 institutions: MEDIUM
More than 7 institutions: HIGH

B. Percent of intra-regional exports

The percentage of intra-regional exports is the second factor contributing to this study of degree of regional organization over time. The numbers in this row throughout Appendix 1 are percentages of exports within the region as a percentage of country totals by the countries belonging to the region during each time period under discussion. The percentages are averages of each member country's intra-regional export figures. The ranking system is as follows:

6–10 percent: LOW
> 10–20 percent: MEDIUM
> 20 percent: HIGH

C. Value of regional weapons imports as percentage of world total

The percentage of regional weapons imports as a percentage of the world total is the third factor contributing to this study of degrees of regional organization over time. The numbers in this row throughout Appendix 1 are percentages of the value of a region's weapons imports during each time period under discussion. The percentages are taken from a calculation of

regional weapons import value relative to world totals. The ranking system is as follows:

> 10 percent: LOW
> 6–10 percent: MEDIUM
0–6 percent: HIGH

2. Ranking Degree of Regional Organization

The purpose of Part 2 of Appendix 2 is to explain how the information contained in Table 2 in the text was prepared.

As mentioned in Table 1, every LOW score is given a value of 1; every MEDIUM score is given a value of two; and every HIGH score is given a value of 3. In determining the final ranking of degree of regional organization, the numerical values associated with every L, M, and H are added together. This results in a score for each region at each time period under consideration. This numerical score is the "degree of regional organization." The scores are compared over time, showing the development or lack thereof of regional organization. The ranking system is as follows:

0–4: LOW degree of regional organization
5–6: MEDIUM degree of regional organization
> 7: HIGH degree of regional organization

Example: For Southern Africa in the period from 1960 to 1964, the regional institution factor is "low," the intra-regional exports factor is "low," and the weapons imports factor is "low." According each "low" a score of 1, the total value of the degree of regional organization in that time period is 3. According to the above scale, that indicates a low degree of regional organization in the 1960 to 1964 period. This calculation is done for every region in every time period and the results are displayed in Table 2.

Notes

[1] See Appendix 2 for an explanation of how the empirical data are manipulated.

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